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ABSTRACT

The New England fishing industry is presented in detail including
an historical review. a discussion of current difficulties. and an
examination of the public policy dilemma between resource conservation
and industry promotion.

Continuing efforts to revitalize the United

States fishing industry are discussed and underlying problems that have
had a negative impact upon the New England industry are outlined.

Finally.

an alternative public policy approach is developed which addresses
fundamental difficulties in the New England region.

This approach calls

for an elimination of federal financial assistance to the fishing industry
and a reduction in the amount of fishery imports reaching the New England
market.

Although this alternative approach is developed from the New

England perspective, a wider application is possible.
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I:

INTRODUCTION

Fishing represents one of this nation's first industries.
exhibits
nation.

To many, it

the charisma of independence and hard work that forged a
And yet, upon closer examination, the industry is seen as one

beset with increasing difficulties.
Regardless of what sector of the industry is viewed, each suffers to
some degree from anyone of a number of difficulties including; high
operating costs, elastic consumer demand, resource instability and foreign
competition.

In the New England region, the fishing industry is currently

caught in a cost-price squeeze which is aggravated by increasing competition
in both the fishery, where resources are limited, and in the market place,
where demand is limited.
Identifying appropriate solutions to the industry's problems has
been made particularly difficult by the public policy dilemma between
conservation of the fishery resource and promotion of the fishing industry.
The intent of this paper is to focus on this dilemma, particularly as it
relates to the harvesting sector of the New England fishing industry, and
to present an approach that addresses the industry's fundamentpl difficulties.
A fishery is the interaction between the population of fish being
harvested, the population of fishermen and the environment of each. 1/
Although technological advances over the years have modified the fisherman's
interaction with a population of fish and insulated him somewhat from the
vagaries of the environment, the fisherman still remains a hunter/gatherer.
The fishing industry is the association of and interaction between
the fishermen, wholesalers, processors, retailers and the marketplace.
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All sectors of the industry, nevertheless, remain inexorably linked
to the biological and environmental factors which are responsible for
fluctuations in resource availability.

Consequently, the variable

nature of resource supply represents an intractable destabilizing
factor which has a dramatic influence upon all sectors of the industry.
The U.S. fishing industry today is somewhat difficult to characterize
because it is composed of so many diverse segments.

The more advanced

segments can be described as highly organized corporations and businesses.
Vessels utilized by this segment are generally large and sophisticated
with the capacity to remain on the fishing grounds longer and the capability
to transport more fish to processing facilities further from harvest areas.
In contrast is the more traditional pursuit of fisheries as an
individual or family business.

Many small companies are community-based

and draw extensive labor from nearby areas.

Vessels are smaller, designed

for a particular specialized fishery and utilized for shorter trips.
Traditional fishing skills, vessels and gear are passed along within
families for generations with individuals developing expertise in one
or two fisheries and depending upon these alone for their annual income.
The fishing industry in the New England region is, by and large,
composed of single unit enterprises which are substantially debt capitalized.
These operations are small in size and low in productive efficiency with
a costly per unit output.

Rapid expansion in the fleet, facilitated by

federal financing, has exerted extreme pressure on many fish stocks and
brought about a decline in per vessel earnings.

The industry's economic

condition has been worsened by competition with low-priced imported
fishery products which have captured a significant share of the domestic
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market and inhibited development opportunities for the region's harvesting
sector.
When situations have threatened to produce

undesirable outcomes in

any sector of the economy, the federal government has been called upon
to intervene.

The fishing sector is no exception; its history is replete

with examples of federal intervention to forestall or counteract adverse
conditions.

Although these efforts have led to the implementation of

several federal programs designed to increase demand for fishery products,
fishermen have most often called upon the federal government for capital
assistance to reduce operational expenses.

However, while financial

assistance has alleviated many of the fisherman's immediate problems,
such measures have often compounded the industry's fundamental difficulties.
A decade ago, the federal government expanded its role as trustee
of public resources by assuming an active responsibility for marine
fisheries management.

Consequently, the New England fisheries, like others,

have been brought under a complicated regime which attempts to optimize
biological as well as economic and social conditions.

Unfortunately, these

goals have not been attained due largely to the difficult compromise
between

resource conservation and industry promotion.

Access to the fishery or to the market is an important consideration
in relation to the conservation/promotion dilemma.

At present, federal

financial assistance facilitates new entry into various fisheries and
enables many marginal operators to remain in fisheries they would have
otherwise been forced to exit.

The federal government, therefore, has

supplanted market forces as the determining factor in the number of
participants in a given fishery.

This has exacerbated the problem of
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overcapitalization and worked against federal fishery management efforts.
Imported fishery products enter the market in a fashion which
fluctuates unpredictably.

Consequently, it is virtually impossible

for a domestic harvester to anticipate market supply on any particular
day.

Given that imports consistently undersell comparable domestic

product and account for a significant share of the New England market,
these supply fluctuations create dramatic price changes which have a
negative impact upon the domestic harvester.
Limiting access to a fishery through property right assignment has
been suggested as an optimum approach to the problems associated with
overcapitalization.

However, limiting entry opportunities alone will

not assure the condition of the resource and represents little more than
a means of maximizing the social welfare of a relatively minor segment of
society.
Limiting foreign access to domestic markets through the imposition
of trade barriers has been suggested as a means of stimulating development
opportunities for the industry.

However, the stocks of traditional

species of fish available to the region's harvesting sector are not
ample enough to enable the industry to adequately displace imports.
Consequently, any protectionist

measure will create market disruptions

that will have a negative impact upon the consumer without creating longterm benefits for the region's fishing industry.
The key premise of the approach which will be developed in this
paper is that the way in which access to the fishery or to the market
is achieved is a more important consideration in the context of resolving
the conservation/promotion dilemma than is the consideration of who has
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access; a consideration inherent in both the limited entry concept and
proposals to erect trade barriers.

Based on this premise, an elimination

of those federal assistance programs which facilitate entry and
perpetuate overcapitalization; and, a shift in market conditions by
encouraging exporting nations to voluntarily reduce their exports and
utilize the New England market in a more orderly fashion, is put forward
as a more effective approach to the region's conservation/promotion dilemma.
This approach will be more fully developed in the following sections
through an overview of the region's fishing industry, an historical
discussion of the industry's current difficulties, a review of federal
intervention and an examination of the costs associated with federal
fishery policy.
While the emphasis in this paper is on New England, it should be
kept in mind that various other sectors of the U.S. fishing industry, like
the Gulf of Mexico shrimp fishery and the North Pacific crab fishery, are
subject to many of the same fundamental difficulties.

Therefore, it is

intended that the basic thrust of this examination could prove beneficial
if applied to other regions beyond New England.
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II:

THE NEW ENGLAND FISHING INDUSTRY

The New England fishery is located in the Gulf of Maine, Georges
Bank region of the Northwest Atlantic.

This boreal region is marked by

the convergence of the northerly flowing warm waters of the Gulf Stream
and the southerly flowing cold waters of the Labrador Current.

The mixing

patterns created by these currents are responsible for high nutrient
concentration.

Consequently, the primary productivity of the region is

relatively high compared to other oceanic ecosystems and is responsible
for high productivity throughout the food chain. 2/

This accounts for the

diversity of the New England fishery.
There are more than 40 edible finfish species of varying value, 12 shellfish species of commercial value and 5 commercially important crustaceans.
However, the principal species harvested in the region, listed according to
value, include: scallop, lobster, cod, yellowtail flounder and haddock.
Other important species include: hard shell clams, menhaden, soft shell
clams, quahogs, squids, whiting, pollock and herring.

1/

The Gulf of Maine/Georges Bank region is essentially a bight bordered
on the east by the Bay of Fundy and Nova Scotian coast; on the north by
the coast of Maine; and on the west by the coasts of New Hampshire,
Massachusetts and Rhode Island.

Although the New England fleet operates

out of virtually every small port and embayment along the New England
coast, the principal fishing ports in the region include: Rockland and
Portland, Maine: Gloucester, Boston and New Bedford, Massachusetts; and
Point Judith, Rhode Island.

Commercial fishery landings in these six

ports represented 64 percent in quantity and 49 percent in value of
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landings in the New England region in 1983. 4/

Not incidentially, in

these same ports are located the major processing facilities in the
region.

Fish landed in one of the smaller ports is generally transported

to a principal port for processing and distribution.
The Harvesting Sector
The harvesting

sector of the industry includes several thousand

fishermen working aboard hundreds of vessels that range in size from
small outboards to those well over one hundred feet in length.

These

vessels can be roughly grouped into an inshore and offshore fleet and
characterized by the fishing method and gear type used.
The principal gear types in the region include mobile gear, such
as otter trawls and dredges, and static gear, such as lobster traps.
Other gear types include seines, weirs, longline, gillnets and a variety
of clam rakes.
The otter trawl is the primary gear used to harvest groundfish or
bottom dwelling species like cod, haddock and flounder.

It is essentially

a large bag made of netting which is towed behind the vessel.

The mouth

of the net is held open on a horizontal plane by use of "doors" attached
at an angle to each wing of the net.

Water pressure acting on the doors

provides the outward force necessary to spread the mouth opening.

The

vertical opening is established by use of floats on the upper edge of the
mouth opening and a weighted bottom edge.

The portion of the net where

fish is entraped is referred to as the "cod-end".
The trawling- operation on a groundfish vessel is a continuous
sequence of setting out the gear, towing the net for several hours and
then hauling back the net, emptying the catch from the cod-end and setting
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out again for the next tow.

On vessels that work the offshore fishing

grounds, where the time spent fishing is generally several days, landed
fish are eviscerated and packed on ice below deck.

Vessels that fish

inshore grounds generally make only day trips, therefore, the catch is
usually not packed on ice.
When the otter trawl was first developed, it was designed to be set
and retrieved over the side of the vessel and towed from a block on the
vessel's stern.

Although there are many "side-trawlers" in the fleet,

since the 1950s, "stern-trawlers" have become much more popular due to
increased stability and ease of operation.
The scallop fishery has become increasingly important to the region
in recent years.
fishery.

The scallop dredge is the principal gear used in this

It consists of a steel frame rectangular "mouth" to which is

attached a steel towing arm.

To the underside of the mouth is attached

a heavy "tickler" chain which scrapes the bottom to lift the shellfish.
To the mouth and tickler chain is attached a bag of constant width which
is held out by a steel bar or "clubstick".

The underside of the bag is

made of steel rings that can withstand bottom abrasion.
bag is generally made of netting.

The top of the

Dredges may vary in width from 5 feet

to as much as 16 feet, depending upon the size of the vessel on which it
is to be used.
A scallop dredge is towed on a single wire cable and is set and
retrieved over the side or the stern of the vessel depending upon the
ship's configuration.

Some of the larger vessels are capable of towing

several dredges at the same time.
Complete scallop shells are scraped up from the bottom and held in
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the bag until the dredge is brought aboard the vessel.

As with otter

trawling. scallop fishing is a continuous sequence of setting. towing.
retrieving and resetting.

Once the scallops are brought aboard. the

shells are opened and the meat removed and packed on ice or refrigerated
below decks.
In both the groundfish and scallop fisheries. vessel size is similar.
The inshore fleet. on the average. consists of vessels in the 5 to 50
net ton range which are operated by one or two fishermen.
are generally in the 60 to 125 net ton range.

Offshore vessels

Crew size on offshore

groundfish vessels is generally between seven and nine.

On scallop vessels.

crew size is generally greater due to the labor intensive nature of
"shucking" scallops at sea.
The lobster fishery has been important to the region for many years.
This crustacean is principally harvested by means of traps or "pots" of
differing size and configurations

which lie on the sea bed, although there

is some offshore harvest of lobster using mobile trawl gear.

Lobster traps

are designed in such a way that the lobster cannot escape once it has
entered the trap in pursuit of bait.

The lobster is eventually removed

when the fisherman retrieves the trap.
The inshore trap fishery is conducted from vessels ranging in size
from small outboards to vessels 30 or more feet in length.

These vessels

are usually operated by one or two fishermen who tend several "trawl"
lines strung with one or more traps.
The offshore trap fishery is relatively new with rapid expansion
having occurred within the last several years due. primarily. to the
development of the hydraulic trap hauler.

Traps in this fishery are
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fished in trawl lines from as few as 20 to as many as 100 traps each.
Vessels in the offshore fishery are larger than those in the inshore
fisherYt however t generally not as large as those used in the offshore
groundfish and scallop fisheries.
Although many of the offshore vessels in the New England fleet today
have the capability to pursue various fisheries during different seasons t
for the most part t offshore fishermen tend to engage in one fishery
throughout the year.

The inshore fleet is quite different in this

respect with fishermen alternating fisheries on a seasonal basis.
According to the Resource Assessment Division of the National
Marine Fisheries Service t

~/

statistics on number of vessels and fishermen

in various fisheries are difficult to determine because of the amount of
participant overlap between fisheries.

This difficulty has been compounded

by the recent change in the method used to tabulate fisheries data; it
is now designed to obscure individual vessel identifiers.
The most current information available on number of fishermen and
vessels employed in the groundfish and scallop fisheries was compiled by
the International Trade Commission from unpublished statistics of the
National Marine Fisheries Service.

~/

In 1983

there were 986 vessels

utilizing otter trawl gear during at least part of the year; 275 of which
utilized this gear as the principal gear type.

i/

There were 6 t 202

fishermen employed on otter trawl vessels in that year t however, only 1,550
of those worked on vessels utilizing otter trawl gear as the principal
gear type.
There were 291 vessels utilizing scallop gear during 1983; 108 of
which utilized the scallop dredge as the primary gear.

Ninty-four percent
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of the primary-gear scallop fleet in that year were vessels in excess
of 100 tons utilized in the offshore scallop fishery.
On vessels utilized primarily for scallop fishing in 1983, 1,086
fishermen were employedj however, on vessels utilized at least part
of the year for scalloping, there were 2,821 fishermen employed. lQ/
Because lobster fishing is largely seasonal and conducted primarily
by an inshore fleet, it is difficult to determine the number of vessels
and fishermen dedicated to this fishery.

The most comprehensive

information available on the lobster fishery was compiled by the New
England Regional Fisheries Management Council as part of the American
Lobster Management Plan.

According to this source, in 1979 there were

10,513 vessels and 12,484 fishermen engaged in this fishery during at
least part of the year.

The majority of these (10,325 vessels and 11,467

fishermen) were employed in the coastal trap fishery.
In 1983

ll/

the New England region ranked fourth in terms of quantity

of fish landed and third in terms of value.

Landings of finfish,

mollusks (such as clams and scallops) and lobsters in the region equalled
711 million pounds valued at $435 million.

This represented an increase

in quantity of approximately 3.5 percent and a 16 percent increase in
value over 1982 landings.

ll/

The vessel ownerS average net income has shown a downward trend in
the past four years.

This has been due to a variety of factors including

an increase in operational expenses and a decrease in gross revenues.

ll/

Remuneration for crewmen throughout virtually the entire New England
fleet is based on the lay system whereby a crewman is paid a share of
the value of each trip's landings, minus a certain percentage of trip
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expenses.

Because the lay system enables the vessel owner to transfer

some of the financial risk of fishing to the crew, 14/ the crewman's
net share has also exhibited a downward trend which parallels that of the
vessel owner's. ~/
Processing, Distribution and Marketing Sectors
Once fish is landed in port, it is subjected to two basic levels
of shores ide activity; fish buying and fish processing.

The fish buying

sector unloads, sorts, ices, boxes and ships the fish to processors or
directly to markets, depending upon the species.

In 1982 there were

282 wholesale plants in New England employing 1,600 individuals. 16/
Boston and New Bedford, Massachusetts, utilize an auction system
where buyers bid on fish that has been landed overnight.

Portland, Maine,

is in the process of developing a more advanced display auction system.
Although these auctions are not the only outlet for the fishermen's
harvest, the Boston and New Bedford auctions tend to set the daily price
levels for all fish sold in the region.
There are also a number of cooperatives, owned and operated by
fishermen, which buy fish directly from the members, thus eliminating a
layer in the marketing process.
There are two principal types of processing conducted in the
New England region.

Primary processors fillet fresh groundfish either

by hand or by machine.

Fish packed on ice has a limited shelf life,

therefore, the length of time a vessel spends on the fishing grounds effects the
quality of fish and, consequently, whether or not the processed product is
destined for the fresh or frozen market.

Because frozen fillets are of
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lower demand and require packaging and storage, which lowers the
financial return on the product, the fresh fillet market predominates. 18/
Recently, there has been an effort to encourage fishermen to improve
handling techniques in order to improve fish quality.

Although most

of the fish handled by primary processors come from within the region,
a significant amount is imported from other regions and countries.
Secondary processors operate large plants with sophisticated
machinery handling a raw product in the form of fish slabs and blocks.
These processors produce frozen fish portions, sticks and dinners not
identified by species name.

Due to the proximity of the New England

fishing grounds and the ready access to the higher priced fresh fish
market, New England fishermen do not harvest fish for blocks or slabs.
Therefore, the raw product utilized by secondary processors is virtually
all imported.
Other types of processing conducted in the region include sardine,
industrial and shellfish.
the State of Maine.

The sardine industry is located entirely in

It is a seasonal industry which harvests, processes,

packs and distributes immature herring in the form of canned sardines.
Industrial processors handle menhaden and other unmarketable species
which are reduced to fish oil and meal, the former used as an emulsifier
in paints and the latter used as a poultry feed additive.

Shellfish

processors produce breaded shrimp, clams and scallops primarily for the
restaurant market.

The bulk of shellfish harvested in the region,

however, is not destined for the processed food market.
Essentially all of the lobsters landed in New England are marketed
live.

Wholesalers, who store the lobster in impoundments or circulating
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seawater tanks, distribute the product directly to retail markets.
In 1983

there were 221 processing plants of all types in New

England which employed 6,923 individuals on a yearly basis and as many
as 9,427 individuals during the seasonal high.

~/

This represented

a decline of 9 percent in the number of plants and a 14 percent decline
in the number of employees since 1979. 20/

The production of groundfish

fillets declined by 11 percent, from 73.6 million pounds in 1979 to 65.3
million pounds in 1983.

Production of frozen groundfish fillets also

declined during this period, from 16.6 million pounds in 1979 to 15.9
million pounds in 1983.

~/

Marketing in the region is conducted by telephone in a complex network
of individuals with close business relationships.

Because of perishability

problems, the product must be moved quickly or placed in cold storage.
In addition, the variable nature of resource availability lead to wide
fluctuations in daily supply and price.

Although New England fish has

for years been principally marketed within the region, in recent years,
inroads have been made in markets to the west. 22/

However, competition

with imports of low-priced foreign fishery products in many domestic
markets has presented an obstacle to market expansion.
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III:

HISTORICAL PERSPECTIVE AND DEVELOPMENTS IN THE FISHING INDUSTRY

Early Development Of The Industry
The codfish grounds of the Northwest Atlantic were discovered by
John Cabot in 1497 and fish curing stations were built in what is now
Maine and New Hampshire even before the establishment of the Plymouth
Colony.

Q/

Fishing played such an integral economic, political and social
role in the development of the New England colonies, that its importance
was symbolized by the "sacred" wooden codfish which has hung in the
Massachusetts House of Representatives since the 1700s.
By 1630 the fishing industry in the region had become quite
profitable.

New England cod, which was generally salt cured in the winter,

was considered a high quality product valued on European markets where
it commanded a higher price than European fish.

To protect this industry,

the Massachusetts General Court established a commission in 1635 to
maintain quality control of the product and manage the trade.
highest quality cod reached Europe.

Only the

The lower quality product was

shipped to the West Indies where it was used to feed slaves.

Vessels

returning from the islands brought sugar and molasses which supplied the
rum distilleries in Newport and Boston.

Thus, the fish trade between the

New England colonies, Europe and the West Indies formed the basis of
what became known as the "Golden Triangle" trade route.

!:!:.../

The fishing industry prospered in New England during the early 1700s.
In Massachusetts between 1765 and 1775, twenty towns along the coast were
devoted to fishing with 605 boats, 4,175 fishermen and 9,600 men involved
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in curing, packaging and transportating. 25/

However, the industry

was devastated by the Revolutionary War due to the disruption in the
international trade and losses of boats, fishermen and shoreside
facilities.
One of the most important points to be resolved during the treaty
negotiations following the war was the right for American fishermen to
pursue fisheries on the traditional fishing grounds of the Northwest
Atlantic.

These rights were secured and embodied in Article III of the

Treaty of Paris, signed on September 3, 1783.
US/Canadian fisheries continue today.

~/

However, disputes over

As recently as October 12, 1984,

the International Court of Justice rendered a decision in a US/Canadian
dispute related to the boundary line in the Gulf of Maine/Georges Bank
region. 27/
While the New England fishing industry suffered due to the direct
effects of the Revolutionary War, it also suffered as a result of foreign
retaliation following the war.

Many European nations imposed import

duties and other barriers to restrict entry of American fish while
British and French fishermen were paid government subsidies in an effort
to more fully develop the European industry. 28/
In 1789, to assist the New England fisheries, the second act passed
by Congress, after the establishment of the new federal government,
provided bounties of five cents for every quintal of dried or pickled
fish exported to another country.

On February 9, 1792, an act was passed

which provided allowances to be paid to the fishing vessel based on vessel
size, amount of fish caught and time spent fishing.
In 1819 these allowances were increased under the stipulation that

17
a logbook be kept and that. in lieu of wages. fishermen were to be
compensated by a share of the proceeds from the sale of the catch.
This was the basis of the lay system which continues today. 29/
By the 1860s the fisheries had stabilized.

Although salt cod

was still an important product, mackerel (pickled or salted) had
increased in value.

In New England during 1859. there were 3,036

vessels and 22,703 fishermen involved in the cod and mackerel fisheries. 30/
The European trade, which was never fully regained, was replaced by demand
from the expanding western states.

Gloucester, Massachusetts, became the

center for salt cod, mackerel and halibut. surpassing landings at all
other New England ports.
The turn of the century brought dramatic change to the fishing
industry.

The steam engine and development of the otter trawl helped

increase catches and decrease time spent fishing, thus making fresh
fish more available.

As demand for the fresh product increased, Boston

became the leading New England fishing port because it was the marketing
and transportation center of the region.

Gloucester, which was dependent

on the salt cod fishery, suffered from decreased demand and cheaper
imports in the 1920s.

However, its processing industry adapted and

flourished by improving filleting techniques, developing new processing
methods such as quick freezing, and processing greater quantities of
imported fish. 31/
Industry Developments Since The 1930s
The New England fishing industry experienced great hardship during
the depression which followed the stock market crash of 1929.

Landings

18
of fish declined by nearly 200 million pounds from 1930 to 1931 with
a decline in value equaling $7 million.

By 1933 only 500 million

pounds of fish valued at $13 million were landed in all of New England.

11/

Fishermen who had jobs earned less than employees in virtually every
other industry; only farm workers made less.

12/

Fishermen were subject to the same financial difficulties that
forced those in other sectors of the economy out of business.

Consequently,

many fishing vessels had to be sold, decreasing employment opportunities
in the industry.

Those who were able to keep their vessels fishing

were barely able to cover operating expenses.

~/

World War II significantly changed the conditions influencing
the supply and demand function for fishery products.

The Navy appropriated

many of the larger fishing vessels and material shortages made it difficult
for other vessels to operate.

In addition, because of the number of able

bodied men drafted into the service, it became hard to crew those vessels
which were still fishing.
However, while harvesting became more difficult, the demand for
fish products increased.

The U.S. government purchased almost all canned

fish available at guaranteed prices and civilians substituted fish for
meat which had

become scarce.

This increased demand for the landings

of fewer vessel brought about higher prices and incomes throughout all
sectors of the industry. 35/
By 1944 New England landings had increased to 714 million pounds
accompanied by a dramatic increase in value. 36/

Yearly earnings for

many fishermen working on large trawlers were as much as $16,000 compared
to a prewar high of about $2,500. 37/

The shores ide sector of the industry
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also prospered with an expansion in the number of processing plants in
the region and an increase in earnings for both dealers and processors. 38/
These trends created great optimism in the industry that prosperity
would continue.

However. after the war. contract buying ceased and

operating costs rose with postwar inflation.

In an effort to increase

prices. fishermen began to reduce their landings. however. processors
turned to lower priced imported fish from Canada and Iceland to meet
demand.

Between 1938 and 1948. imports of fish had increased nearly

six-fold. 39/

In

195~

the introduction of frozen fish blocks that could

be processed into fish portions and fish sticks created a boom in the
retail markets.

Because New England fishermen did not harvest fish for

blocks or slabs. virtually all of the frozen fish blocks were imported.
leaving New England fishermen restricted to supplying the limited fresh
fish market.
Foreign Effort And Extended Jurisdiction
In 1961 Russian fishing ships began fishing on Georges Bank.
Eventually. there were more than 300 large trawlers from as many as
ten foreign nations fishing off the New England coast. 40/
Although initially. these highly efficient vessels harvested only nontraditional species. effort was eventually directed towards more
traditional fisheries like haddock.

This heavy foreign fishing pressure

led to a reduction in the size of many fish stocks. creating supply
problems for the domestic industry. and further exacerbating economic
conditions.
The harvesting of fish is probably the most significant nonbiological
factor influencing the population size of a fishery. and can be looked upon
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as a form of predation.

From a scientific perspective, the linkage

between the resource and the harvesting sector is the rate of fishing
induced mortality; the proportion of a population removed as a result
of fishing.
resource,

ill

~I

Because a stock of fish is considered a common property

each fisherman is in competition with every other

fisherman in maximizing his share of the resource.

In an uncontrolled

fishery, there is no incentive to harvest with restraint because any fish
left by one fisherman will be caught by another.

As more fishermen enter

the fishery, the average catch per fisherman declines.

This lack of

restraint on the harvester's part may eventually lead to what has been
referred to as "the tragedy of the commons", an exhaustion of the resource. 431
Although it is possible to influence the size of fish populations by
controlling some environmental conditions, such as water quality, in areas
like spawning grounds, the most important factor which can be regulated
is fishing induced mortality.
As domestic fishermen and foreign fleets continued the intense
fishing-pressure, results from research surveys conducted by the National
Marine Fisheries Service began to indicate more than a 90 percent reduction
in haddock and a general reduction in finfish of as much as 74 percent
between 1963 and 1974. 441

During this period, New England landings

were in steady decline.
The International Commission for Northwest Atlantic Fisheries (ICNAF)
had management responsibility for fisheries outside the U.S. 12-mile
contiguous zone, however, its management efforts proved to be ineffective
largely because it lacked any enforcement capabilities. 451

With serious

declines in stock levels and an ineffective international management
regime in place, the New England fisherman began a concerted drive in
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1973 for legislation that would exclude foreign fishermen from access
to fishery resources within 200 miles of the U.S. shore.

On April 13,

1976, this effort culminated in the enactment of the Fisheries Cnnservation
and Management Act (FCMA).

~/

Through this vehicle, the U.S. extended

its jurisdiction over the ocean by more than two million square miles

~/

claiming exclusive management authority within what became the Fishery
Conservation Zone (FCZ), a 197 mile wide band of ocean extending from
the 3-mile territorial sea.

Although the U.S. had participated in the

offshore management of fishery resources as a member of the Pacific
Halibut Commission, enactment of the FCMA represented the first time in
U.S. history that the federal government assumed a direct role in the
general management of offshore fisheries. 48/
Fishery Conservation And Management
The assumption of this federal responsibility to regulate fisheries
on conservational grounds stems from the emerging doctrine of the
"public trust". 49/

Originally, all wildlife was considered to be

res nullius, the property of no one until captured.

As exploitation

of this common property increased, many species became seriously depleted
or forced close to extinction.

Fearing a total collapse of resources,

many states have declared a trusteeship over resources for the benefit
of the people.

This movement has led to the adoption of comprehensive

schemes for wildlife management. 50/
The federal government has expanded the public trust doctrine to
provide protection of natural resources via the Endangered Species Act, 51/
the Marine Mammals Protection Act, ~/ the National Park Systems Act, 21/
and the Organic Act. 54/

This doctrine was moved further by the National
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Environmental Policy Act

22/

which placed a new burden on federal

agencies to take into account the public interest in resource
protection.

2£/

The major purposes of the Fisheries Conservation and Management
Act are to: 57/
1.

establish management jurisdiction for the U.S. over
certain fishery resources off its coast;

2.

promote domestic commercial and recreational fisheries
under a special conservation and management regime; and

3.

encourage the development by the U.S. fishing industry
of domestic underutilized and unutilized species.

Title I 58/ of the FCMA establishes the Fishery Conservation Zone
and asserts the authority of the U.S. to manage all fish within it.

This

authority extends throughout the migrational range of, excluding the FCZ
waters of another country, all indigenous anadromous species such as
salmon.

Management authority also extends to species of the U.S.

continental shelf and, pursuant to the Outer Continental Shelf Lands
Act,

~/

includes that part of the shelf beyond 200 miles.

However, the

Act exempts tuna, which is defined as a highly migratory species, from this
authority.
Title II 60/ prescribes the mechanism by which foreign fishing
is to be regulated within the FCZ.

Privilege to fish within this

zone will only be granted to foreign flag vessels once a flag nation
enters into a Governing International Fishery Agreement (GIFA) with the
United States.

By entering into a GIFA, the foreign nation agrees to

recognize the authority of the U.S. to manage fisheries within the FCZ
and further agrees that its citizens will comply with all regulations
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promulgated by the United States.

Once entered into a GIFA, fees

will be assessed and permits will be issued to vessels of the
foreign nation to harvest some portion of a species within the FCZ.
Title III

~/

places the federal government in the role of trustee

of fishery resources.

It seeks to ensure that fish are harvested

responsibly according to management plans based on seven specified
standards.

It is a complex multi-tiered system of management which

delegates primary responsibility to eight semi-autonomous Regional
Fishery Management Councils functioning in a form of partnership with
the federal government. 62/

This title is also the most lengthy portion

of the Act and the portion which has caused the most consternation
within the industry.

Fishermen who originally supported enactment of

the FCMA were primarily interested in establishing a 200-mile limit
excluding foreign fishermen from valuable fishery resources.

New England

fishermen now argue that the Act goes beyond the original intent,
subjecting them to severe encumbrances.

In the New England region,

where a multi-species multi-gear fishery exists, the management problems
have been extreme.
Title IV 63/ establishes miscellaneous provisions and authorizes
appropriations to carry out provisions of the Act.
On August 28, 1978, the FCMA was amended to set out the conditions
under which foreign fish processing vessels may receive U.S. harvested
fish in the FCZ. 64/

Management plans for fisheries in which a potential

for "joint venture" exists must now contain specifications of the
estimated domestic annual harvest, the estimated annual utilization of
the harvest by domestic processors, and the amount of U.S. harvested
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fish which foreign vessels may receive from U.S. fishermen.
In 1980 the Act was further amended by the American Fisheries
Promotion Act (AFPA) to help strengthen and develop U.S. fisheries.
The AFPA authorized grants for research and development projects related
to fisheries, authorized financial assistance for fishing vessels
and shores ide processing facilities, modified foreign allocation levels,
established new criteria by which allocations are assigned and increased
foreign permit fees and requirements.

The AFPA further amended the

Fishery Conservation and Management Act by changing the title to the
Magnuson Fishery Conservation and Management Act in honor of Senator
Warren Magnuson (hereafter referred to as the MFCMA or the Magnuson Act).
In January 1983 the Act was once again amended to modify its
procedural requirements and streamline the process by which fishery
management plans are prepared, approved and implemented.

~/

The Magnuson Act is scheduled to be reauthorized in 1985.

At this

time, however, final action has not been completed on reauthorization
legislation by the 99th Congress.

It appears unlikely that the reauthorized

version will be appreciably changed from current law.
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IV:

FEDERAL ASSISTANCE AND INTERVENTION IN THE FISHERIES

The fishing industry is mainly composed of small businesses that
must finance what is often very expensive capital equipment.

These

businesses normally do not have access to private markets for equity or
long term capital.

Instead, they are generally restricted to short and

intermediate term debt from commercial banks, industrial finance
companies and credit unions.

Because their operating results and the

liquidation value of their collateral are uncertain, they are often forced
to pay risk premiums in the form of high interest rates.

Consequently,

operations are small in size and low in productive efficiency with a
costly per unit output.

This situation tends to inhibit expansion and

restricts development opportunities in all sectors of the industry.
For nearly two centuries, the federal government has been called upon
to help the industry confront these obstacles.

In many respects, similar

efforts continue today.

The Drive For Tariff Relief
Prior to 1939, a two cent per pound duty had been imposed on imported
groundfish fillets.
foreign competition.

This proved an effective barrier to excessive
However, beginning in 1934 the U.S. began reducing

tariffs on many items and in 1939 the tariff on fish was also reduced.
In 1948 the U.S. became a party to the General Agreement on Tariffs
and Trade (GATT), a multilateral international trade agreement that provides
a code of conduct for signatory nations and establishes mechanisms for
expanding trade and resolving disputes. 67/

GATT established a quota system

with a fixed tariff on fish of 1-7/8 cents per pound on the first 15 percent
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of average annual consumption and 2-1/5 cents beyond that.

However,

while the early tariff had added the equivalent of 40 percent to the
cost of fish on the U.S. market, with the upward surge in fish prices after
1948, the new GATT tariff rate added only an equivalent cost of 9 and 12
cents respectively.

This add-on cost has not proved substantial enough

to inhibit imports, thus the amount of protection received by the
domestic fisherman was diminished by GATT. 68/
In reaction to this, the New England groundfish industry petitioned
and was granted a hearing before the Tariff Commission in 1951.

The

Commission, however, found that the industry had not suffered from
imports and did not show evidence that it would in the future.

The

Commission, therefore, recommended that tariffs on groundfish not be
increased. 69/
A similar petition was filed in 1954 and, although the Tariff
Commission in this case found injury and recommended a limit on imports
and an increase on tariffs and quotas, 70/ President Eisenhower rejected
the Commission's recommendations due to the recent introduction of fish
sticks, the production of which depends upon supplies of fish blocks.
President reasoned that

The

because virtually all fish blocks are imported,

in the long-run, it would be a disservice to the entire industry to limit
imports.

2l/

In 1956 the industry, once again, appealed to the Tariff Commission
for relief from imports.

Although the Commission ruled in favor of

the industry recommending higher tariffs,
rejected that recommendation.

ll/

President Eisenhower again

This time, however, the rejection was not

based upon what he considered a possible disservice to the fishing industry
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but "all other pertinent factors bearing on the security and well
being of the nation". 73/

Although the President recognized that

serious injury had been done to the U.S. fishing industry by the
level of imports, the economic health of our allies (Canada and
Iceland) had priority.
As part of the 1964 GATT talks, the Tariff Commission conducted
another limited groundfish investigation and, as a result of its findings,
groundfish were removed from the agenda, thus the previous tariff rates
were maintained.

However, rates on other fish items were steeply

reduced and duties on frozen blocks were removed entirely.

~/

Because

the products made from frozen blocks proved competitive with some fresh
groundfish, the 1964 GATT negotiations were detrimental to the New England
industry.
Since the 1964 GATT negotiations, the U.S. International Trade
Commission (formerly the Tariff Commission) has undertaken three
investigations to determine whether or not injury has been caused to the
domestic industry as a result of fishery imports.

In 1978 the Commission

ruled unanimously that the U.S. industry was not injured by the
importation of certain duty free Canadian fish.

Although the Commission

determined that U.S. imports of groundfish products from Canada had
increased, so had the U.S. consumption of domestic groundfish.

Therefore,

the impact of imports from Canada was primarily on U.S. imports from
other countries. 75/
In 1979 the International Trade Commission again ruled that the
U.S. industry had not been injured and was not likely to be injured by
the importation of fish and shellfish from Canada.

In this petition,
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filed by the Point Judith Fishermen's Cooperative Association of

u.s.

Narragansett, Rhode Island, the Commission determined that

landings

of the fish in question had increased while the ratio of imports from
Canada to U.S. consumption fell.

In addition, the Commission was unable

u.s.

to determine that the price of Canadian fish differed from
as was alleged.

fish

Interestingly, the Commission held that fishery

management plans established as a result of the Magnuson Fishery
Conservation and Management Act would assist in expanding

u.s.

production

of groundfish. ~/
In 1980 the Commission ruled once again that imported groundfish
products did not pose a serious threat to the

u.s.

industry.

In this

case, the International Trade Commission (ITC) determined that the increased
imports were in the form of frozen product and that virtually all of
the domestic production is marketed fresh.

The Commission recognized

that the imported frozen product may have presented a problem to the

u.s.

industry, however the conservation quotas established on the east

coast were considered by the Commission to be the industry's primary
problem.

12/

These quotas had been established pursuant to the MFCMA

which the ITC had determined a year earlier would assist in expanding

u.s.

groundfish production.
In December 1984 the International Trade Commission completed an

investigation of the conditions of competition affecting the northeast
groundfish and scallop industries in selected markets. 78/
a suit for injury, but a fact gathering exercise.

This was not

The report does,

however, contain information which substantiates the domestic industry's
claims that foreign fishing industries, particularly Canada's, have an
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unfair economic advantage due to heavy government assistance.

It is

likely that these findings will form the basis for the industry's
future effort to secure some form of relief.
Efforts To Boost Product Promotion
The New England fishing industry has had little luck securing relief
from imports; however, since the end of World War II, other forms of
federal assistance have been sought.

In this respect, the industry has

been more successful: several programs have been implemented that are
designed to either increase demand for fishery products or lower the
harvesting, processing, and other production costs.
As early as 1947, the Atlantic Fishermen's Union tried to get
support for fish similar to that extended to agricultural products.
In 1950 Congressman John Kennedy introduced legislation which would have
set up a $3 million price support program for fisheries and, in 1954
the industry attempted to persuade Congress to add a rider to a farm bill
to support the price of fish.

~I

In 1954 the first truly significant piece of fishery assistance
legislation was enacted.

This Saltonstall-Kennedy (S-K) Act, 801 which

was designed to encourage the distribution of domestic fishery products,
directed the Secretary of Agriculture to transfer to the Secretary of
Interior, who administered the Fish and Wildlife Service and its
predecessor agency the Bureau of Fisheries, an amount equal to 30 percent
of the gross receipts from duties collected on fisheries products.
These monies are maintained in a separate fund to use for promoting the
free flow of domestically produced products in commerce by conducting
educational services, technological, biological and related research
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programs.
origin.

and by developing markets for fishery products of domestic
In the past ten years. more than $132 million in S-K monies

have been obligated for various fishery projects. 81/
Since its inception. S-K funding has been used in several ways to
increase demand. including the establishment of voluntary guidelines
for sanitation and product inspection in an effort to improve product
quality.

Efforts to institutionalize inspection and grading of fish.

however. have met with opposition due

~rimarily

to the reluctance of

fishermen to change work habits. 82/
Saltonstall-Kennedy funding has also been used for market research
and development.

The U.S. Bureau of Commercial Fisheries contracted for

a study of New England marketing problems and also ran market development
programs during the late 1950s and the 1960s utilizing S-K monies. 83/
Programs Of Direct Financial Assistance
Federal programs to reduce harvesting and production costs have
played a far more important role than efforts to expand markets and
increase demand.

In this respect. S-K funding has been used in a

variety of fashions. such as:to fund studies of vessel insurance. development
of training programs and for technological research.

Government-funded

research has contributed significantly to changes in vessel technology.
new species utilization and innovation in fish handling techniques. 84/
The most significant cost to the New England fishing industry has
been vessel financing.

For years there has been a capital shortage due

to a lack of conventional financing.

In 1956 Congress passed the Fish

and Wildlife Act 85/ which established the Fisheries Loan Fund.

This Act

empowered the Secretary of the Interior to make loans for the financing
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and refinancing of the operation, maintenance, repair and replacement
of fishing gear and vessels.
In 1960 Congress passed legislation which provided vessel construction
subsidies to cover the difference between the costs of vessel
construction in the

u.s.

Fleet Improvement Act

~/

and abroad.

In 1964 the United States Fishing

amended the 1960 Act in an attempt to ease

the construction cost differential of fishing vessels built in U.S.
shipyards.

Under this Act, direct subsidies are made available to

fishermen for the construction or reconditioning of fishing vessels
in U.S. shipyards provided that such subsidies do not exceed 50 percent
of the cost differential.
In 1970 the Merchant Marine Act of 1936 was amended to establish
the Capital Construction Fund

~/

into which up to 100 percent of

annual taxable income attributable to the operation of an eligible
vessel may be deposited.

These funds are exempt from income taxes

provided the Fund is used to construct or reconstruct vessels built in
the U.S. and documented under U.S. law for operation in the domestic
fisheries.
In 1971 Congress passed the Farm Credit Act

~/

which, in part,

permits owners of commercial fishing businesses to borrow directly
from the Farm Credit System to finance operating expenses or capital
expenses such as vessels, engines or gear.
In 1972 the Federal Ship Financing Act 89/ amended the Merchant
Marine Act of 1936 further to provide a federal guarantee for loans
from commercial banks for a percentage of the cost of constructing or
reconstructing fishing vessels.

The repayment period for the Fishing
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Obligation Guarantee Program varies for each loan according to the
borrower's ability to repay and the vessel's useful economic life.
Finally, the Small Business Administration operates several
loan programs which can provide direct financing for the purchase of
new and used vessels.
As highlighted above, in the past 40 years, the economic weakness
of ehe fishing industry has prompted the government to intervene in a
variety of ways for the purpose of assisting in the promotion and
economic development of the industry.

In many instances, however, the

government has intervened without a clear understanding of the problem,
the possible effects of its intervention or even how the intervention
would be implemented.

In addition, these programs of intervention have

often failed to take into account the regional differences in the
industry and how various programs might impact specific fisheries.

The

Fisheries Loan Fund and the domestic management regimes of the Magnuson
Act provide cases in point that are illustrative of some of the
shortcomings of federal intervention in the fisheries.
The Fisheries Loan Fund
The Fisheries Loan Fund was established by enactment of the Fish
and Wildlife Act of 1956. 901

It authorized loans to the industry for

not more than 10 years at not less than 3 percent interest for financing
and refinancing the operation, maintenance, replacement, repair and
equipment of fishing gear and vessels.

211

The Fund was not, however,

intended to enable new entry into the fishery through the financing of
a used vessel owned by a fisherman replacing it with a new vessel.

This

was made clear in the report language which stressed that the Fund was
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to be used only when there was an "inability to secure adequate
financing to upgrade vessels and equipment to keep pace with new
developments in technique".

~/

The Loan Fund thus began operations

with the dual purpose of encouraging upgrading of vessels and of
helping existing fishermen to stay in the industry. ~/

By 1965 the program had been shifted in an opposite direction
because of a series of bureaucratic and political changes.
the upgrading of vessels was a more appropriate

obje~tive

Although
in already

overcrowded fisheries, it was much easier for the Bureau of Commercial
Fisheries, which administered the program, to implement the second
objective of helping existing fishermen stay in the fishery.

In fact,

more than 60 percent of the loans made were for refinancing or for
operating expenses.

It was apparent that the Bureau began to view the

program entirely in terms of assisting individual fishermen remain in
the fishery. 94/
Suprisingly, the program was altered, eliminating the requirement
that the old vessels be removed from the fishery prior to financing
of new vessels.

The intent behind this change was to attract new

fishermen into the industry and thus provide the seller with a higher
price for his vessel to make it possible for him to pay a higher
downpayment on a new vessel.

Although the subsidization of the purchase

of a used vessel did enable the seller to obtain a higher price, the
new entrant was financially no better off than if he had paid a higher
interest rate on a smaller loan. 95/
More seriously, however, this change in the administration of the
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Fund encouraged the overcapitalization of the fishery.

Because each

new entrant in a fishery directly competes with all other prior entrants,
the share of all available fish is reduced for each.

This situation has

a double consequence in that each fisherman shares a smaller proportion
of the available resource but more of the resource reaches the market,
thus resulting in a price decline.
In reaction to the inherent problems in overcapitalized fisheries,
the Bureau of Commercial Fisheries began to develop provisions to
limit expansion.

However, it was not until 1973 that the Bureau's

successor agency, the National Marine Fisheries Service (NMFS), published
regulations to deal with this problem. 96/

This regulation designated as

"conditional" certain fisheries determined to be overcapitalized.
In a conditional fishery, subsidies administered by NMFS are not
available to expand capacity and will only be made available when an
equivalent harvesting capacity has been removed from that fishery.
Upon implementation of this new policy, the Fisheries Loan program
had been returned to the standard which prevailed between 1956 and 1965.
The legislation had gone full cycle and yet, the financial assistance
programs were still administered in such a way as to aid individual
fishermen rather than to revitalize the industry as a whole.

The basic

problem in this case was legislative rather than bureaucratic.

The

original legislation gave the agency enough leeway to operate a small
loan program, which was consistent with the legislation, however, the
legislative goal of modernizing the industry was not satisfied.

As the

agency's experience with the program increased, it encouraged the
evolution of the legislation in the direction of the function
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it could administer more effectively. 97/

In addition, due to political

considerations, the conditional designation is difficult to impose
on a fishery.

Therefore, this mechanism has not proved totally effective

in limiting expansion in overcapitalized fisheries.
An administrative moratorium on the use of the Fisheries Loan
Fund was declared in 1972.

However, the Fund was reactivated pursuant

to the American Fisheries Promotion Act (AFPA) in 1980 98/ although
modified so that it is now funded by foreign fishing fees.

The AFPA

also altered the purposes for which the Fund can be utilized.

According

to the report language, monies are to be made available, first, to cover
defaults on obligations guaranteed by the U.S. under the Fishing Obligation
Guarantee (FOG) program and, then, monies may be used to avoid defaults
on non-guaranteed obligations and to cover vessel operating expenses
where a net operating loss is incurred.

~/

Because of the serious economic problems which have beset many
sectors of the U.S. fishing industry recently, the FOG program has come
under serious stress as the default rate increased.

Between 1976 and

1980, the program had experienced only 3 defaults totalling $978,000.
However, since the beginning of Fiscal Year 1981, the program has
experienced 63 defaults totalling $25,652,000. 100/

Although the Fisheries

Loan Fund was envisioned by Congress as a means of protecting against
serious defaults, the NMFS was reluctant to utilize the monies in the
Fund which totaled $10 million in 1983.

Instead of utilizing these

monies, the agency has gone to the Treasury to borrow $18 million, at an
interest rate of approximately $5,779 per day, to cover defaults which
have occurred just since 1983. 101/
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The problems encountered with the Fisheries Loan Fund in this case,
unlike those of the past, were bureaucratic rather than legislative.
The criteria set forth by the NMFS to implement the program and the
way in which the Fund was administered ignored the Congressional
intent of the AFPA.

The Fisheries Service has covered defaults according

to the intent of the Act, but it did so by drawing on Treasury resources
rather than on Fishery Loan Fund resources which are generated by
foreign fishing fees.
The New England Groundfish Fishery Management Plan
Although government intervention to forestall or counteract economic
conditions has often created its own set of problems, the variable nature
of the resource also presents a factor which has a dramatic effect upon
all sectors of the fishing industry.
Fisheries management is a very inexact science.

Analytical

limitations coupled with the procedural complexity of the Magnuson Act
has often forced the Regional Councils to respond in a reactive nature
rather than strategically.

Because of the uncertainty caused by

informational limitations, managers have had to revise plans several
times to accommodate short term considerations often based on economic
criteria.

In this way, managers often overlooked the long range planning

necessary to satisfy the stock rebuilding goal for the sake of maximizing
the fishermen's yearly catch and income and to maintain the Council's
political stability.

The difficult compromise between promotion of the

industry and conservation of the resource has led to piecemeal development
of guidelines incorporating trip limits, quotas and vessel allocation. 102/
The early development of the Atlantic Groundfish Fishery Management
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Plan (FMP) is a case in point.

Due to the complex nature of the

New England fishery and the depressed condition of many stocks therein,
this FMP was one of the first approved. 103/

Eleven weeks after

implementation of regulations, domestic fishermen exceeded the entire
cod quota for 1977.

The fishery was subsequently closed; however, the

public reaction against the closure was so intense that the Secretary
of Commerce instituted emergency economic provisions which raised the
quota, opened the fishery and thus, relieved the political pressure.
Thereafter, management plans were changed almost weekly with the quotas
increased five times during the next three years. 104/

This direct

regulation of the harvester had supplanted the fisherman so that the
Council had begun making decisions normally made by the fisherman. 105/
Moreover, these yearly quotas played havoc with the market by creating
gluts, price declines and idle fleets.
In an attempt to alleviate these market problems, the Council
instituted quarterly quotas designed to spread the catch more evenly
throughout the year.

However, the capacity and capability of the vessels

varied to such a degree that

all were not

able to take an equal

share of the resource before the quota was reached.

This prompted the

Council to further amend its plan to allocate quotas based on vessel
class.
Unfortunately, the imposition of quotas encouraged fishermen to
engage in intense fishing when the season opened.

Quotas were then

viewed as targets with the end result being that quotas were reached
more quickly than intended.

As the initial quotas were reached, the

Council would establish new ones which, in turn, became the new harvest
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target. 106/

Eventually, there were more than 100 different quotas

regulating the harvest of Atlantic groundfish.
A quota system can be an effective means of reducing fishing
mortality while preserving the common property nature of the resource.
In this case, however, the system proved to be ineffective from a
biological perspective because the original quota was not maintained.
It also proved to be a failure from a socioeconomic perspective because
the system was too complicated.

This neither enhanced the conservational

goals nor fostered the promotional aspects of the Magnuson Act.
In addition, this scenario led to a serious decline in the
reliability of commercial fishery statistics upon which active regulation
depends.

According to the New England Regional Council, "fishermen have

reported where and how much fish have been caught in such a way as to
avoid a violation of the regulations rather than to convey accurate
information.

Because of limited enforcement resources and an unwillingness

by fishermen to testify against others, data evasion could not be prevented.
The erosion of the data base has skewed data important for stock
analysis . . . . " 107/

Fishermen often considered the management plans too

technical and as a consequence of widespread misreporting, they did
not agree with the scientific and technical data upon which management
plans were based.

"As a result, the plans and accompanying regulations

were not well received and supported." 108/

Any support which may have

existed was further eroded by the fishermen's perception of inconsistent
enforcement.

In a report by the General Accounting Office, fishermen

"allege that NMFS efforts for the most part have centered on Gloucester
where the agency's regional headquarters is located while other ports,
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such as New Bedford, which harbor large fishing fleets, receive
lesser attention.

They also indicate that smaller ports throughout

the entire region receive little or no coverage . • . . A Department of
Transportation internal audit report cited the Coast Guard for similar
inconsistencies in its enforcement program specifically in the 3 to
12 mile offshore area." 109/
Because of the continued changes in regulation, the ability to
secure regulatory loopholes and the perception of inconsistent
enforcement, fishermen have generally not been cooperative with
management routines.

Unfortunately, because fisheries management

schemes can only attempt to manage fishermen and not fish, maximum
effectiveness in any management plan depends upon a high degree of
cooperation from the industry.
The fact that difficulties were encountered during the implementation
of the Atlantic Groundfish FMP is not surprising when one considers that
the Council system was a new entity, that the NMFS was just beginning
to grasp its role under this new system and that for the first time
in the history of the New England fishery, domestic fishermen were
brought under a federal management regime.
The Council abandoned this active form of management in order to
concentrate on the long term concerns of the multi-species fishery.
Stock conditions had stabilized by 1979 to the point where the Council
felt intervention and control could be minimized.

In effect, the Council

has for several years utilized a passive form of management incorporating
mesh size restrictions and closed areas.

The fishery has been permitted

to operate with as little restriction as possible to both gain a better
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understanding of the fishery's dynamics and to permit the Council
time to prepare a long term management program. 110/
Recent declines in resource stock size has again given the
Council and fishery scientists cause for concern.

In the fall of

1984, the New England Council submitted its new multi species
Atlantic Demersal Finfish (ADF) plan to the public for review.

This

plan builds upon the passive form of management utilized during the
past three years.

The objective is to prevent stocks from reaching

minimum abundance levels through the imposition of more restrictive
measures, including: a six-inch minimum mesh size for cod-ends used
in certain fisheries; closures of spawning areas during certain times
of the year; and, minimum size limits for various fish species. 111/
This plan is much less interventionists than the original New England
groundfish FMP and has been modified several time during the drafting
stage to accomodate concerns expressed by industry.

112/
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V:

CONDITIONS IN THE NEW ENGLAND FISHERY
AND PUBLIC POLICY CONSIDERATIONS

Following enactment of the Fishery Conservation and Management
Act, there was a rash of investment in the New England fishing industry.
This was due, in part, to a belief that the foreign effort would be
completely displaced from access to the U.S. fishery resources, that
resource management had been put on a rational basis which would assure
resource stability and that underutilized fishery resources would be
developed as a result of a new national commitment to the fishing industry.
However, while landings of Atlantic groundfish have generally
increased since 1977, per vessel landings have declined due to the
distribution of the harvestable resource among a greater number of
vessels.

This expansion of the New England fleet has seriously aggravated

some of the problems already besetting the industry.

An increase in

domestic supply coupled with an increase in imports has brought about
a decline in per vessel gross earnings.

And, with the fleet expanding

at a faster rate than gross output, an increase in the cost of fuel,
supplies and especially interest rates has led to a decline in net
returns on investment.
According to the most current information published by the National
Marine Fisheries Service, between 1965 and 1981, the New England fleet
expanded more than 125 percent, from 594 to 1,344 vessels.

During this

same period, the number of fishermen increased by 100 percent, from 3,404
to 6,798 individuals. 113/
The relative volume of landings during this period changed little,
however, from 297 thousand metric

tons in 1965 to 298 thousand metric
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tons in 1981. 114/

The rate of increase in landings certainly did not

keep pace with the rate of increase in the number of vessels.

The

expanding capitalization of the fleet during this period led to a
negative impact upon the individual vessel performance.

Between 1965 and

1981, landings per vessel declined by as much as 56 percent. 115/
The value of landings, on the other hand, increased dramatically
during this period; from $45.9 million in 1965 to $229.5 million in 1981.
Even after adjustments for inflation, this still represented an increase
in value of as much as 89 percent.

However, the increased value of

landings did not alter the decline in individual performance.

The

average adjusted value of landings per vessel declined during this
period by 16 percent. 116/
The decline in per vessel value is not readily evident because of
the significant increase in ex-vessel prices that had taken place.
Between 1965 and 1981, the unadjusted price of all fish at the ex-vessel
level increased approximately 400 percent.

As a comparison, the general

price level for all goods and services in the economy increased by only
200 percent. 117/
The economic performance of the New England groundfish sector in 1982
was approximately equal to its performance in 1965 despite several
unfavorable conditions; landings of major groundfish species declined
significantly while operational expenses increased.

Between 1965 and 1982,

the cost per unit of landings in the otter trawl fishery increased nearly
500 percent; however, the value of groundfish landings during this period
also increased by as much as 500 percent, enabling the groundfish sector
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to keep pace with the increases in operational expenses. 118/
The scallop sector of the industry displayed a different trend
than the groundfish sector.

Landings of scallops increased approximately

46 percent between 1965 and 1981 while value increased more than 700
percent.

However, during the same period, the scallop fleet expanded

by as much as 400 percent.

Consequently, per vessel landings showed

a 70 percent decline while per vessel value declined 32 percent.

The

cost per unit of landings in this sector had, by 1982, increased by
526 percent.

In that year, the financial status of the scallop sector

was 2 percent below what it had been 17 years earlier. 119/
The lobster sector of the New England fishing industry has also
not done well.

The costs per unit of landings in 1982 were more than 200

percent higher than they were in 1965.

However, the deflated value of

per unit landings remained relatively unchanged during this period.
In only four of the 17 years between 1965 and 1982 did the economic
performance of the lobster sector exceed its performance in 1965. 120/
As with the groundfish and scallop fisheries, the major factors for the
poor economic performance was the increased cost of production and
overcapitalization of the fleet.
The variable nature of the resource has also had an impact on the
performance of the fleet.

When the Magnuson Act was implemented in 1977,

the principal groundfish stocks (cod, haddock and yellowtail flounder)
were severely depleted due to excessive fishing pressure.

Between 1977

and 1979, the condition of the resource had improved as a result of
reduced foreign fishing pressure and the institution of domestic management
measures.

However, since 1979 the condition of these stocks has changed.
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Cod stocks currently rival historic high levels.
there were 16,700 metric
49,000 metric

In 1983

tons harvested in the Gulf of Maine and

tons harvested on Georges Bank.

Fishing effort has,

however, increased sharply which could lead to a long term reduction
in yield. 121/
The haddock stock is currently in a serious decline.

The Gulf

of Maine stock declined 65 percent between 1979 and 1983 and the Georges
Bank stock declined 57 percent

dur~ng

the same period.

Should the level

of fishing pressure remain constant, the decline in the stock will
continue. 122/
Yellowtail flounder stocks are also in decline, raising concern
that the trend may again become serious.

Because cod, haddock and

yellowtail stocks exist in a multi-species fishery, continued pressure
on abundant cod stocks may have a deleterious effect on haddock and
yellowtail. 123/
Catches of American lobster in 1983 equalled arecord high 20,300
metric

tons; the bulk of which, 17,500 metric

the inshore fishery.

tons, was harvested in

However, the rate of harvest is well above

sustainable levels and remains a source of serious concern to the
National Marine Fisheries Service. 124/
The harvest of sea scallops in 1983 was down 56 percent from a peak
in 1978.

The available stock equals approximately 25 percent of the

1975 - 1979 level.

Fishing effort nearly doubled between 1982 and 1983,

however, the stock remains in a serious decline.

Should these conditions

continue, the availability of scallops will remain poor in the years
ahead. 125/

45
Increased production costs, excessive fleet capacity and declines
in resource availability have had a dramatic impact upon the performance
of the harvesting sector; however, competition with low priced foreign
imports represents a significant obstacle to improvements in the industry's
economic performance.
United States imports of various fishery products increased
substantially between 1979 and 1983.

According to a report prepared

by the International Trade Commission, 126/ imports of fresh, whole
groundfish into the region more than doubled in volume and tripled in
value between 1979 and 1983.

Imports of fresh groundfish fillets

during this period increased by 73 percent in quantity and 86 percent
in value.
Canada was the principal supplier of various fishery products
during this period, accounting for more than 58 percent of the quantity
and 57 percent of the value.

In the fresh market, Canada accounted for

99 percent of the volume of imported fresh whole groundfish and 95
percent of the volume of fresh groundfish fillets.
Virtually all imported fish from Canada was able to undersell U.S.
fish in domestic markets because of Canadian government assistance to its
fishing industry, much of which is comprehensive and unparalled
United States.

in the

Specifically, Canadian government assistance to the Atlantic

groundfish and scallop industries includes vessel construction assistance,
operating cost assistance (ice, fuel, equipment), price supports, technical
and marketing services, special unemployment assistance, and infrastructure
development. 127/

On any given day, Canadian fish is able to undersell

U.S. produced fish by as much as a dime a pound.
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With lower prices, imports are accounting for an increasing share
of consumption in the region's fresh fish markets.

The ratio of

imports to consumption for fresh whole groundfish increased from 4 percent
in 1979 to 10 percent in 1983 while the ratio for fresh groundfish
fillets increased from 12 percent to 21 percent during the same period.
Virtually all frozen groundfish products consumed in the region are
imported. 128/
This is particularly troublesome considering that U.S. per capita
consumption of fish products and shellfish is relatively low compared
with domestic consumption of other food items.

While per capita

consumption of meat and poultry equals approximately 200 pounds, only
12 pounds of fish and shellfish is consumed per capita annually and more
than a third of this is shrimp and canned tuna fish.

These figures

have held steady for more than a decade despite shifts in consumer
preferences among various food types. 129/
Revitalization Efforts During The 98th Congress
Conditions in the industry today are serious in many respects.

High

production costs, resource instability, competition with low priced
foreign imports and relatively low demand have had a negative impact
upon the industry's economic performance.

Considering that the government

has historically provided some form of assistance to the industry when
economic conditions warranted, it is not surprising that similar efforts
to secure federal assistance continues.
During the 98th Congress, several pieces of legislation intended
to assist the fishing industry were introduced.

The most significant

of these included the Fisheries Development Corporation Act, 130/ the
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Marine Resources Development Bank Act 131/ and the National Fisheries
Marketing Council Act. 132/
Fisheries Development Corporation Act
The extent to which the United States has turned to quasi-government
institutions to assist other domestic industries, such as agriculture,
housing, transportation and communications, has suggested to many that
this approach can be beneficial to the development of the U.S. fishing
industry.

Government corporations distribute some of the financial

risk of a venture among all taxpayers and yet are unlike government
agencies in that the government functions as a private enterprise rather
than as a sovereign.
The Fisheries Development Corporation Act would have created a non-profit,
quasi-government corporation into which existing assistance programs would
have been folded, to provide the fishing industry with loans and loan
guarantees, joint venture opportunities, insurance, federal grant
administration and other services such as promotion and market development.
Initial funding for the Corporation would have included 60 percent of
all unobligated Saltonstall-Kennedy funds, all unobligated monies available
from the Fisheries Loan Fund, and any direct appropriations necessary to
equal the difference between $100 million and the amount transferred from
the Sal tons tal I-Kennedy Fund and the Fisheries Loan Fund.

Continuing funding

would have been obtained through a variety of mechanisms including: eighteen
percent of gross receipts from duties collected under the Customs laws on
fishery products; foreign fishing fee receipts; such sums as may have been
necessary to pay the personnel and administrative costs of the Corporation
each fiscal year; up to $1.5 billion in obligations purchased through the
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Federal Financing Bank; and receipts from fees, charges, or premiums
imposed and collected by the Corporation.
Although aspects of the corporation concept were considered
beneficial, industry representatives voiced their concerns about several
aspects of the bill during hearings before the fisheries subcommittee
of the House Committee on Merchant Marine and Fisheries. 133/

The principal

concern expressed by New England fishing industry representatives had
to do with the possibility of creating another layer of fishery bureaucracy.
In addition, a representative of the New England Fisheries Development
Foundation expressed concern about the strong likelihood that the
Corporation would compete with or completely displace the regional
development foundations. 134/

The New England foundation, in particular,

has proved to be an extremely effective means of channeling federal funds
toward a plethora of industry development projects of regional significance.
The merits of replacing a proven private program with an unproven federal
program were certainly questionable.
The Fisheries Development Corporation Act did not garner the
support necessary to move it through the Congress and the bill was
never reported by the committee.
Marine Resources Development Bank Act
Many sectors of the fishing industry have emphasized the need for
government assistance to refinance the existing industry debt through
some type of wrap-around financial service that would be capable of
consolidating existing debt and allow longer amortization periods at
lower interest rates.

Loans for vessels and facility reconditioning or

conversion, for the purchase of new or used vessels, facilities and gear,
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and a broad range of export financing assistance has also been considered
necessary by many.

Rather than restructure and consolidate existing

assistance programs as proposed in the Corporation bill, the Marine
Resources Development Bank Act would have established a banking type
institution designed to provide financing and working capital for the
purchase and operation of vessels and shoreside facilities.

The Bank

would also be able to facilitate export transactions by making loans
available to foreign importers.
Initial capital for the Bank would have come from the Fisheries
Loan Fund and foreign fishing fee receipts, with continued funding
through the issuance of Bank obligations in the private credit markets,
with the full faith and credit of the U.S. pledged to the payment of
obligations.
Like the Development Corporation, several aspects of the Development
Bank concept were considered beneficial from the industry's perspective,
but equally as many negative possibilities, including increased
bureaucracy, were brought out during subcommittee hearings. 135/
While industry concerns about increased bureaucracy are certainly
valid, the most serious problem for the New England fishing industry
inherent in the Development Bank, as well as the Development Corporation,
are provisions which would have perpetuated the overcapitalization of the
fleet through loan and loan guarantees.

The Development Bank was the

most troublesome in this respect because, unlike the Corporation which
was intended to provide many other services to the industry, the principal
function of the Bank was to facilitate financial assistance through loans,
loan guarantees and consolidation of existing debt at longer amortization
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periods.

Considering that the economic weakness of the New England

industry is exacerbated by the excess fleet capacity, any program that
facilitates increased fleet capitalization may precipitate economic
dislocations throughout the region's harvesting sector.
For many of the reasons discussed, as well as a host of logistical
difficulties associated with moving a controversial bill through the
legislative process, the Marine Resources Development Bank Act, like
the Fisheries Development Corporation Act, did not receive final
consideration before the adjournment of the 98th Congress.

Legislation

similar to these bills has not, as yet, been introduced in the 99th Congress.
National Fisheries Marketing Council Act
In general terms, the

u.s.

fishing industry is composed of fiercely

competitive independent entrepreneurs.

Because of this, there is little

cohesion in the industry and limited market coordination.

This lack

of coordination has often resulted in inadequate, inaccurate and untimely
price and quantity information and a lack of uniform product description,
standards and quality.

The seasonal aspect of various fisheries and

the consequent annual variation in supply, coupled with the uncoordinated
market structure and low product quality have inhibited market expansion
for many fisheries.
Essentially, the seafood industry is drastically undermarketed
because the industry, as a whole, spends very little on advertising
as compared with other foods.

In many regions, marketing budgets

and programs remain insufficient relative to the potential that exists.
In response to the inadequacy of the industry's marketing efforts and the
consequent lack of development opportunities, the National Fisheries
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Marketing Council Act 136/ was introduced in the 98th Congress.
This measure was intended to help stimulate marketing and
promotion through consumer education.

As introduced, initial funding

for the Council would have included $10 million from foreign fishing
fees and $4 million from the Saltonstall-Kennedy Fund for the first
three years of its operation.

An industry-wide referendum would be

held to determine whether the Council should be operated with funds from
an industry assessment.

Importers and processors of fishery products

would annually be assessed 0.2 percent of the price of fish purchased
to pay for Council operations.

No assessment would be required for

firms in any segment of the industry in which at least 50 percent of
the firms have petitioned for exemption from assessments.

In addition,

any firm with annual gross revenues of less than $500,000 would be exempt
from assessments, a cap on the annual assessment per firm would be established,
and the Council would not be permitted to raise or lower the rate of
assessment by more than 0.1 percent in any year.
Fifty percent of the funds collected from a region would be
channeled

back into marketing projects of distinct benefit to the region.

Eligible recipients of those funds would include the regional development
foundations and regional trade associations.

Regional marketing would

be on a product by product or species by species basis.

The remaining

50 percent of the funds collected would be used by the Council for
national generic marketing of domestic fish products.
Like the two bills discussed above, the Marketing Council proposal
contains many attractive possibilities for the industry, however, from
a New England perspective, this proposal presents difficulties.
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The capacity of the region to process and otherwise handle fishery
products is increasing as evidenced by the increase in imports.

Because

per capita consumption is relatively low. it stands to reason that any
major investment in product promotion and market development could
increase consumer demand.

In this respect. the Marketing Council.

from a national perspective. could prove extremely beneficial in
expanding per capita consumption of fishery products.

But. although a

portion of the funds collected by the Marketing Council would be channeled
back into each region for regional product promotion. the proposal could
have a negative impact upon the harvesting sector of the New England
fishing industry.

This is because the traditional regional fisheries

are already producing at near capacity and any supply shortages created by
increases in consumer demand will have to be filled by producers outside
the region.

This situation would benefit New England processors and the

harvesting sectors in other regions like those in Alaska and Canada.
which are looking for an export market for increases in production.

New

England fishermen would not be able to produce enough product to compete
for any increases in demand within the region.

Therefore. increases in

lower priced imported fish would further depress economic conditions
in the region's fishing industry.
The National Fisheries Marketing Council. like the Development
Corporation and the Development Bank. did not receive final action by the
98th Congress prior to adjournment and similar legislation has yet to be
introduced in the 99th Congress.
Public Policy Considerations
When market forces produce or threaten to produce socially
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undesirable outcomes, the U.S. government has traditionally intervened
in some manner for a socially useful purpose: to help restore
and maintain free, open and efficient markets; prevent waste of valuable
resources; forestall degradation of the environment; and protect consumers.
In common property fisheries, government regulation had been the principal
mechanism used for conservation and the prevention of wasteful exploitation
of the resources. 137/
The concept of government intervention to forestall or counteract
adverse economic conditions in the fishing industry would appear to be
acceptable in a general sense.

However, it cannot be taken for granted

that in each case the public interest is best served by intervention
because any positive outcomes may not be worth the cost.

This may

be particularly true if that intervention does not adequately address
fundamental problems.
On a national scale, the commercial fishing industry's contribution
to the Gross National Product (GNP) is relatively minor.

For example,

according to National Marine Fisheries Service statistics, the ex-vessel
value of the total domestic catch in 1980 equaled $2.24 billion. 138/
Including value added by other economic sectors, the value of commercial
fishery products in that year equaled $6.83 billion.

With a $2.64 trillion

GNP in 1980, the ex-vessel value of the fish caught represented only 0.09
percent of the GNP and just 0.26 percent with value added. 139/

In

comparison, the value of the agricultural product in 1980 equaled $67.7
billion or 2.57 percent of the GNP. 140/

Even the net earnings of the

EXXON Corporation alone equaled almost as much in 1980 as the total value
of domestic fisheries products. 141/
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In 1983 the ex-vessel value of the domestic catch increased to
$2.37 billion, however, the percentage of GNP had declined to 0.07
percent.

Using a multiplier of 3 for value added by other economic

sectors, the value of commercial fisheries products produced in the
U.S. represented only 0.22 percent of the GNP in 1983. 142/
With this in mind, it is important to consider that a portion
of the annual total federal expenditure is utilized by several
federal agencies in direct and indirect support of the fishing industry
and fishing related programs.

The 1983 expenditure by government agencies

for various programs was $318 million, which breaks down as follows: 143/
$155 million

$2 million

Department of Commerce for the National Marine
Fisheries Service and fisheries related research
of the National Sea Grant College Program;
Department of Health and Human Services for the
fish and shellfish sanitation program of the
Food and Drug Administration;

$52 million

Department of the Interior for the fishery resource
programs of the U.S. Fish and Wildlife Service;

$10 million

Department of State for international fisheries
commissions and fisheries related activities
of the Bureau of Oceans and International
Environmental and Scientific Affairs; and,

$99 million

Department of Transportation for the fisheries
enforcement activities of the U.S. Coast Guard.

These 1983 federal expenditures in support of the fishing industry
equaled approximately as much as 5 percent of the estimated value of the
domestic commercial fishery product and as much as 13 percent of the
total ex-vessel value of domestic landings in that year.
If one considers that federal monies are a form of public resource,
than the best interest of society as a whole is perhaps not being
realized by even this level of federal expenditure for a relatively
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minor national industry.

If it is appropriate to assume that the public

trust doctrine can be expanded to include fiscal resources as well as
natural resources, then it should be appropriate to assume that efficient
utilization of fiscal resources is in the best interest of society.
Bearing in mind the present condition of the traditional New England
fisheries, if efficient utilization of fiscal resources isan appropriate
objective, then it is reasonable to argue that federal expenditures
in support of the fishing industry and fishing related programs should
not be made unless such expenditures assure efficient utilization of
fishery resources.

From this perspective, it is arguable that further

expenditures for federal intervention in the New England fishery should
be eliminated and the fishery allowed to operate in response to its
own internal market and biological forces; a laissez-faire approach. 144/
However, uncontrolled fishing effort will create serious biological
consequences leading to economic dislocations that may have an extremely
negative impact upon discrete sectors of the economy.
Commercial fishing provides a primary source of income for many,
it support a variety of ancillary businesses and it is important to
local economies in several regions of the country.

It therefore

remains an important consideration of the federal government.

However,

it is clear that fisheries like those in the New England region cannot
continue on their present course.

Overcapitalization, declining stocks

and the consequent marginal returns on investment have led to a
destablization which does not bode well for the industry's future.
Millions of federal dollars are spent each year to maintain the
fishery resource and support the fishing industry, yet, in the New England
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region, traditional stocks are in decline and the industry's economic
condition remains weak.

This suggests a failure, or at least a reluctance,

to address fundamental difficulties.
Although the Fisheries Development Corporation, Marine Resources
Development Bank and the National Fisheries Marketing Council were
not established by the 98th Congress, it is likely that efforts
to secure federal assistance for the industry will continue.

Before

the Congress is again called upon to provide such assistance, careful
consideration should be given to the costs as well as the potential
benefits of continued federal intervention in the fishing industry,
and an approach which addresses basic problems should be implemented.
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VI:

RESOLVING FUNDAMENTAL DIFFICULTIES: AN APPROACH FOR NEW ENGLAND
The fundamental problem in federal fisheries policy has been the

inability of the government to adequately address the dilemma between
conservation of the fishery resource and promotion of the fishing
industry.

A piecemeal approach to this problem will not bring about

a satisfactory resolution because the various factors contributing to
the problem are closely interrelated.
It has become evident that there are certain liabilities associated
with open access to fishery resources and that steps must be taken to
reduce the fishing pressure on traditional stocks.

It is also recognized

that as long as low priced imported fishery products have open access
to domestic markets, development opportunities for the region's harvesting
sector will remain limited.

To stabilize and begin to improve upon the

conditions prevalent in the New England fishing industry/will require
that aspects of competition in both the fishery and the marketplace be
modified.
Who has access to the fishery or to the market is the primary
consideration of most proposals to bring about changes in the conditions
of competition. However, how that access is achieved is a far more
important consideration in the context of resolving the conservation/
promotion dilemma.

Based upon this premise, an elimination of those

federal assistance programs which facilitate entry and perpetuate
overcapitalization; and, a shift in market conditions by encouraging
exporting nations to voluntarily reduce their exports and utilize the
New England market in a more orderly fashion

is suggested as a more
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effective approach to the region's conservation/promotion dilemma.

Elimination Of Federal Financial Assistance
Legislative initiatives designed to forestall economic difficulties
in different sectors of the fishing industry have often failed to take into
account the limited nature of fisheries resources and the impact of excess
harvesting capacity upon these resources.

Because the legislative process

often requires the use of coalitions to move legislation through the
system, each member tends to work for a share of the largesse for his
constituency.

In this way, legislative initiatives often fail to adequately

consider the regional variations in fisheries and the impact of various
programs on the fishing industry in different parts of the country.
An infusion of federal dollars may prove benefical to one sector of the
industry while, at the same time, prove destabilizing to another sector.
This can be particularly troublesome to already overcrowded fisheries.
In a situation where the resource being exploited is the common
property of all, there is no incentive to exploit with restraint, and
self interest considerations tend to be put above consideration of the
common good.

The attempt to maximize individual benefits by all of the

users in a system such as a fishery tends to have a deleterious effect
upon the resource and then upon the system itself.

In common property

fisheries, there is no incentive to leave some fish for tomorrow
because another fisherman will harvest it today.

As more fishermen

work to maximize their harvest, the resource will begin to decline,
as will each fisherman's share of the resource and, consequently, his
profits.

This results in a loss of the fishery resource and its potential

economic and social benefit for all.

Garrett Hardin, in his classic
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paper, referred to this situation as the tragedy of the commons. 145/
The principal purpose of the Magnuson Fishery Conservation and
Management Act is to prevent such a tragedy from being played out in
the fisheries.

However, as has been examined previously, some

management approaches utilized under the auspices of the Magnuson Act
have not been completely effective in optimizing stock levels and have
led to some economic inefficiencies in the industry.
If the government discontinues the expenditure of funds for
management programs in an effort to conserve society's fiscal resources,
the fisherman's resources of time and money would initially be utilized
more efficiently.

However, uncontrolled exploitation of fishery

resources would eventually result in economic extinction, the point where
so little of the resource is available that the costs of harvesting
exceed the return on investment.

Not only would this create serious

economic dislocations in the fishing industry, but society would have
lost a valuable natural resource, at least temporarily, providing the stocks
were capable of rebuilding.
Property right assignment or limited entry schemes, which have been
utilized to some extent in other countries, 146/ have been suggested as
an optimum approach to the complex common property problem in this
country 147/ and provisions for the use of limited entry have been set
out in the Magnuson Act. 148/

However, although the Magnuson Act

asserted the prerogative of the United States to claim property rights
to fishery resources within the Fishery Conservation Zone, a prerogative
which has been affirmed by the President's proclamation of an Exclusive
Economic Zone, 149/ these property rights have not been further divided
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and apportioned to domestic users due to strong opposition from the
industry.

Because of the independent characteristic of the commercial

fishing enterprise, efforts to restrict freedom of entry into the
occupation are anathema to fishermen.

In the New England region where

management problems have been extreme, limited entry has never been
considered a viable option due to political considerations.
Limited entry schemes, however, do not necessarily represent an
optimum approach to the conservation/promotion dilemma.

First, such

measures carry inherent costs which may possibly prove greater than the
costs of current programs.

For instance, federal expenditures will be

required to maintain a licensing or permit system, expenses will be
incurred for enforcement and, if a vessel buy-back program is established
as part of the scheme, federal funds will be necessary.

Second, limited

entry schemes must be used in conjunction with other management tools
such as catch and effort restrictions to ensure the condition of the
fishery resources. 150/

Lastly, limited entry schemes are primarily a

means of maximizing the utilization of the individual fisherman's resources
of time and money. 151/

In essence then, limiting entry is a means of

maximizing social welfare and it is assumed that the function of government
is not to maximize the welfare of any segment of society which is capable
of helping itself.
In the case of the fisheries commons, the government's dilemma is
how to conserve the resource and develop the industry simultaneously.
Development costs are substantial in terms of fiscal resources and, as
previously examined, federal financial assistance encourages entry and
tends to exacerbate the common property problem.
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Hardin's solution to the tragedy of the commons is mutually
agreed upon coercion. 152/

Although imposition of a limited access

scheme would certainly be a form of coercion, it is unlikely that it
would receive the industry's endorsement.

Similarly, the New England

Council's interventionist form of quota-based management was not
mutually agreed upon and did not adequately address the commons dilemma.
On the other hand, the passive form of resource management outlined
in the New England Council's recent Demersal Finfish plan, is a much
more acceptable form of coercion, but it falls short of addressing the
overcapitalization problem and requires significant enforcement resources.
However, this passive form of management could form the basis of an
effective approach to the conservation/promotion dilemma if, in conjunction,
federal expenditures for programs of financial assistance for the industry
are reduced or eliminated and a portion of the consequent savings used for
enforcement activities.

In effect, the market would become the determining

factor influencing entry and exit in the fishery, not the government as
is currently the case.
The 1983 outlays for financial assistance to the U.S. fishing industry
equaled $9,609,000 153/ for various programs which included:
$829,000

Fishing Vessel and Gear Damage Compensation Fund
which provides compensation to fishing vessel
owners who sustain losses or damage to their gear
or vessels attributable to any foreign vessel

$327,000

Fishermen's Contingency Fund which provides
reasonable compensation to commercial fishermen
for damages to or loss of fishing gear related
to oil and gas exploration, development and
production on the outer continental shelf

$157,000

Fishermen's Loan Fund which provides for loans
to vessel operators at subsidized rates for
purchasing, constructing, equipping, maintaining
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repa1r1ng or operating new or used commercial
fishing vessels or gear
$1,682,000

Fishermen's Guarantee Fund which provides payment
to vessel owners and crews to compensate for
certain financial losses sustained as a result of
foreign seizures of American fishing vessels found
within 200 miles of their coasts

$6,614,000

Federal Ship Financing Fund for Fishing Vessels
which is used to cover defaults on loans guaranteed
by the federal government

In the New England region in 1983, 51 claims for a total of $229,325
were paid from the Fishermen's Contingency Fund; four loans for a total
of $226,500 were made with monies in the Fisheries Loan Fund; five vessels
were financed at a total cost of $1,568,571 with loan guarantees through
the Fisheries Obligation Guarantee program; and, a total of $6.2 million
was withdrawn from the Capital Construction Fund to finance the construction
and reconstruction of several vessels. 154/

In essence, federal financial

assistance enabled, either directly or indirectly, several vessels to
enter and more than fifty vessels to remain in various New England
fisheries despite the fact that individual vessel performance has been
in decline as a result of overcapitalization.
An attempt to reduce or eliminate any of the above programs would
undoubtedly meet with stiff industry opposition.

However, given the

depressed economic condition in the New England fisheries, an economic
collapse will loom on the horizon as long as federal programs continue
to provide entry opportunities or maintain the fleet's overcapitalized
condition.

With marginal operators removed from the fishery and entry
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opportunities reduced, significant headway could be made towards
addressing the overcapitalization problem.

And, with additional funds

available for increased enforcement, the effectiveness of the Council's
management efforts would be increased, thus addressing the conservation
problem.

This scenario would lead to a stabilization in the region's

traditional fisheries.

However, development opportunities will remain

limited as long as low-priced foreign imports continue to flood the
New England market.
Limitation Of Foreign Competition
A primary objective of Congress in passage of the Magnuson Act was to
provide for the full development of the United States fishing industry.
This legislation granted the domestic industry preferential access to
fishery resources and substantially restricted relatively heavy foreign
fishing activity.

Despite the provisions of the Magnuson Act, the objective

of a fully developed and modernized U.S. fishing industry has not been
realized.

In 1983, the foreign harvest of fishery resources in the U.S.

Exclusive Economic Zone (EEZ) was 1.3 million metric tons, a 43 percent
decrease since 1976. 155/

However, total U.S. landings during this period

increased by only 450,000 tons, or 18 percent. 156/

A number of causes

for this scenario have been discussed, however. a relevant point is that
since enactment of the MFCMA, imports of foreign fishery products to the
U.S. have increased by $2.8 billion and currently supply 68 percent by value
of the total U.S. supply of all fishery products. 157/

In 1976, a u.S.

trade deficit in fishery products of $1.9 billion existed.
that deficit had reached $4.1 billion.

By 1983, however,

Therefore, the issue of the nature

and extent of U.S. imports of fishery products is significant in terms of
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the health of both the U.S. fishing industry and the U.S. economy.
A widespread perception in the U.S. fishing industry is that
imported fishery products enjoy an unfair economic advantage over U.S.
products.

Production costs are deemed to be unrealistic in U.S. terms

due to government subsidies and relatively low labor costs.

The current

strength of the U.S. dollar overseas, however, is also an important factor.
Because of the magnitude of fishery imports, the timing and extent of
imports substantially influences the U.S. market and negatively impacts
the economic viability of various sectors of the U.S. fishing industry.
It is also generally perceived that the U.S. government has not adequately
addressed this problem and that ongoing federal efforts to protect U.S.
interests impacted by trade have disproportionately focused on products
other than fish.
The government of Canada participates heavily in financial assistance
programs for the Canadian fishing industry. 158/

Canada also exports to

the U.S. substantial quantities of groundfish and shellfish which
directly compete with traditional New England fisheries.

In 1983 the

value of Canadian fishery products imported by the U.S. exceeded U.S.
exports to Canada by $741 million. 159/

As discussed earlier, Canada is

the principal supplier of the region's imports accounting for 58 percent
of the total groundfish and scallops, 99 percent of the fresh whole
groundfish and 95 percent of the fresh groundfish fillets imported in 1983.
The current fishery trade deficit with Canada, however, pales in
significance to what potentially lies ahead.

The 1982 report of the

Canadian Task Force on Atlantic Fisheries, the Kirby Report, 160/ laid
out the Canadian plan to restructure the Atlantic fisheries through
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direct government ownership of the major processing and marketing
companies, coupled with a government initiative to improve product
quality.

Of major significance is the earmarking of $25 million for

export market development, primarily

in the United States, in an effort to

improve the economic advantage of Canadian fresh fish in the U.S. market.
Should the government be called upon to assist the New England
fishing industry compete against the tide of low-priced foreign imports,
there are several statutory provisions which can be utilized,including;
unfair trade laws, fair trade laws, trade adjustment assistance and laws
regulating the importation of specific commodities.
Unfair trade laws include; the antidumping law, the countervailing
duty law, Section 301 of the Trade Act of 1974 and Section 337 of the
Tariff Act of 1930.
Dumping is essentially selling goods in an export market at a lower
price than they are sold in the exporters home market.

The antidumping

law, Title VII of the Tariff Act of 1930, 161/ provides for the imposition
of a duty, equal to the margin of dumping, on all imports that are sold
at less than fair market value in the United States.
The countervailing duty law, Subtitle A of Title VII of the Tariff
Act of 1930, 162/ provides for the imposition of additional duties
whenever it is determined that a foreign nation has subsidized the
manufacture or production of an article exported to this country.
Section 301 of the Trade Act of 1974 163/ provides the authority
for the President to enforce U.S. rights under international trade
agreements in response to unfair foreign practices.

And, Section 337

of the Tariff Act of 1930 164/ declares unlawful, and establishes procedures

66
against. unfair methods of competition and unfair acts in the importation
or sale of articles.
Fair trade laws include relief from injurious increased import
competition and relief from market disruption by imports from Communist
countries.
Section 201-203 of the Trade Act of 1974. amended by the Trade and
Tariff Act of 1984. 165/ establishes authorities and procedures for
providing temporary relief for U.S. industries and workers injured by
increased import competition.

Such relief can take the form of tariffs.

quotas. import restrictions and negotiations of orderly marketing
agreements.
Section 406 of the Trade Act of 1974. 166/ provides for duties or
quantitative restriction on imports from Communist countries to provide
relief to U.S. industries and workers injured as a result of market
disruptions created by such imports.
The purpose of trade adjustment assistance programs is to assist in
the adjustment of workers or firms dislocated as a result of a federal
policy to liberalize trade barriers.

Several provisions have been

established in the last twenty-five years via the Trade Expansion Act of
1962. 167/ the Trade Act of 1974. 168/ the Omnibus Budget Reconciliation
Act of 1981. 169/ and the Deficit Reduction Act of 1984. 170/

Programs

established under these acts include: employment services. training and
allowances. job search and relocation assistance for workers; and. technical
and financial assistance for firms.
Finally. there are several laws regulating the importation of specific
commodities including the Meat Import Act of 1979 171/ and the Steel
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Import Stabilization Act 172/ as well as a host of international
commodity agreements.
As discussed in the previous section, the International Trade
Commission, in its report on the conditions of competition in the
Northeast region's fishing sector, 173/ has identified situations which
suggest that the Canadian fisherman has an unfair economic advantage
over his U.S. counterpart because of substantial government support.
Representatives of the New England and Mid Atlantic fishing industries,
under the aegis of the North Atlantic Fisheries Task Force, have decided
to pursue legal action against the Canadians which will be based on many
of the findings in the IrC report. 174/
The decision

to pursue such action was made in light of previous

attempts to secure protection from foreign imports.
considerations have worked against the industry.

In the past, political

Even in those cases where

the industry received a favorable ruling from the Tariff or International
Trade Commission, imposition of tariffs or quotas never came to pass due
to presidential concern about various domestic or international situations.
Because the antidumping and countervail duty laws are the only trade
mechanisms which do not provide for executive discretion, and are therefore
less subject to political considerations, these laws present the best
chance for industry success.

For this reason, the North Atlantic

Fisheries Task Force has opted to pursue a countervailing duty petition.
Conditions today for such action are favorable.

Not only has the

ITC report substantiated many of the industry's claims about unfair
competition, but a recent antidumping suit brought against the Canadian
Salt Cod Corporation has been viewed favorably by the Commissioners of
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the International Trade Commission. 175/

This has suggested to many that

the Commissioners would be disposed to look favorably upon other
petitions pertaining to fish brought against the Canadians.
However. a successful countervail suit and subsequent imposition
of a countervailing duty will not necessarily be the most effective way
to stem the tide of Canadian fishery imports.

Nor will this action

result in increased development opportunities for the New England fisherman.
Tariffs and duties are generally considered to be an ineffective
means of lessening competition in the fishing industry because the tariff
is usually absorbed by the foreign producers or their governments.
Economic studies indicate that fresh and frozen fish tends to have a highly
elastic demand. which means that as the price of the product rises the
amount that the consumer is willing to pay decreases; 176/ a response
very often associated with "luxury" items.

Consequently. foreign producers

cannot pass on the tariff to consumers without losing sales volume.
Other studies suggest that even a tariff of as much as 50 percent
of the import price would not decrease the quantity of fish imported
because of the inelastic nature of supply. 177/

In other words. because

of a host of social and economic reasons. the fishing industry in a country
like Canada could not reduce its effort or production.

Therefore. to

avoid an unmarketable surplus. the exporter or his government will have
to absorb any tariff increases in export markets.
For those nations which export the bulk of any given commodity to
the United States. the protectionist mood which has developed in this
country in recent years is of concern.

The possible difficulties

associated with this attitude could prove particularly troublesome to
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Canada because the United States is its largest trading partner.
In addition, while the Canadian dollar is weak relative to the U.S.
dollar, it is strong compared to currencies in other export markets,
therefore, precluding the opportunity to successfully transfer Canadian
products out of the

u.s.

market.

Currently, there are more than 10 bills pending in the 99th Congress
aimed specifically at offsetting the Canadian trade advantage for
several commodities including pork products and wood products.

Although

the trade in fishery products between the two nations is relatively
minor in relation to other Canadian products exported to the United
States, fishery products will probably be included, at least informally,
on any future trade negotiations agenda.

In fact, legislation has been

introduced in the House of Representatives urging the President to
augment his efforts to resolve trade differences with Canada to ensure
fair competition with respect to several commodities including

fish and

fish products. 178/
The new administration in Ottawa has a more conservative attitude
toward international trade, which is reflected in the trade declaration
signed by President Reagan and Prime Minister Mulroney during the
Quebec Summit. 179/

This agreement calls for a freer trade climate

between the two nations that will encourage market forces to achieve a
more competitive production and distribution of goods.

Consequently, Mr.

Mulroney is under a certain amount of pressure to improve Canada's trade
relationship with the United States.
However, the Canadian government provides a substantial amount of
financial assistance to the fishing industry in an effort to stabilize
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economic and social conditions.

Between 1982 and 1984 this assistance

to the fishing industry in the Atlantic Provinces alone was more than
$70 million. 180/

According to Jacques Roy, Economic Minister of the

Canadian Embassy in Washington, if government assistance to the fishing
industry in Newfoundland is eliminated, the unemployment rate would climb
above 40 percent. 181/

The difficulty in separating fisheries policy

from social policy was also acknowledged by Canada's new Minister of
Fisheries and Oceans. 182/

Therefore, it will be very difficult for

Canada to modify those programs which are viewed as anti-competitive from
an international trade perspective, without creating serious economic and
social upheavals in several regions.
Completely halting or significantly altering the flow of Canadian
fishery imports into the New England region through legal action will
be difficult because of U.S. law and U.S./Canadian politics.

Further,

because of limited fishery resources in the region, New England fishermen
will not be able to displace Canadian imports in domestic markets.
Therefore, in order to improve competitive opportunities for the harvesting
sector of the New England fishing industry, it will be necessary to
encourage the Canadian government to voluntarily reduce their exports and
agree to utilize the New England market in a more orderly fashion.
The climate for such an agreement is very positive today because
Prime Minister Mulroney is caught between an international commitment
to modify Canada's trade policy and a domestic commitment to maintain
the economic stability of the provinces.

It will be hard for Canada to

honor its free trade agreement with the U.S. as long as any of its
industries, including the fishing industry, maintain an unfair advantage
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due to government assistance.

On the other hand, destabilizing the

economy of Atlantic Canada by terminating government assistance to the
fishing industry would certainly be politically unwise.
A Voluntary Export Restraint (VER) agreement presents a positive
option for the Canadian government which is particularly attractive
in light of the threat of a successful countervail duty petition.

The

term "voluntary" is only valid in the sense that the exporting nation has
the difficult choice between limiting some of its exports or having them
prohibited by a protectionist measure of the importing nation. - Voluntary
export reduction agreements have been utilized since the 1930s.

The most

notable recent example of a voluntary agreement is the Japanese automobile
agreement which has been in effect since April 1, 1981. 184/

Also, in

December, 1984, a VER was negotiated with seven nations aimed at reducing
U.S. steel imports to 18.5 percent of U.S. consumption of finished steel
products. 185/
Although it will be argued that Mr. Mulroney could stand fast and
take a chance that the New England industry will once again lose its
petition for relief from Canadian imports, history does not necessarily
always repeat itself.

Further, a voluntary reduction, as a good faith

effort, could have significant international benefits without significant
domestic liabilities.

Should the New England countervail petition be ruled

upon favorably, the Canadian government may find it necessary to reach
a suspension agreement with the U.S. by voluntarily modifying its
marketing practices.
Such accommodations could prove advantageous to the Canadian fishing
industry as well as the New England fishing industry if, in conjunction
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with a reduction in imports, the New England market potential is
exploited in an orderly fashion.

Dampening gross supply fluctuations

through cooperation between the New England and Canadian industries
would tend to bring about price stability.
Further, the Canadian fishing industry could be encouraged to
utilize the display auction system under development in Portland, Maine, 186/
where

theoretically a premium price for quality will be available.
Finally. a product promotion and market expansion program could be

initiated in an effort to develop consumer interest in non-traditional
species.

Aspects of the marketing council proposed in the 98th Congress

could prove beneficial to the New England region in this respect.
With the amount of fishery imports reduced, if only for a limited
period. and the remaining imports entering the market in an orderly
fashion, supply conditions would be stabilized long enough for domestic
fishermen to increase their marketing opportunities.

And, with a marketing

program in place to increase demand, development opportunities for the
New England harvesting sector could be stimulated.
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VII:

CONCLUSION

This paper has reviewed the New England fishing industry, the
background and reasons for some of its more significant problems and
approaches that may help rectify fundamental difficulties.
The industrytociay

e~hibits

a wide degree of diversity.

For the

most part, however, it is composed of small, single unit enterprises
which are often family-controlled.

Throughout its history, and

particularly since the 1930s, the industry has experienced periodic
difficulties which have inhibited the opportunity for increased
development.

These difficulties include foreign competition, high

operating and capital costs, and resource instability caused by inherent
biological and ecological factors.
In response to these problems, the federal government has often
been called upon by the industry to intervene in one form or another.
Repeated attempts to secure increased tariffs and quotas have been
unsuccessful. However, the federal government has initiated several programs
designed to alleviate economic difficulties by increasing demand and
development opportunities, and by reducing capital and operational costs
through direct subsidization.

In addition to efforts to revitalize the

industry, the federal government has also initiated several programs to
ensure adequate maintenance of the resource.

The enactment in 1976 of

the Magnuson Fishery Conservation and Management Act is the paramount
effort in this regard.
Following enactment of this Act, there was a rash of investment in
the industry due to the belief that the foreign effort would be completely
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displaced from access to U.S. fishery resources, that resource
management had been put on a rational basis and that a new national
commitment to the fishing industry existed.

However, in the years

since enactment of the Magnuson Act, expansion has increased at a
rate faster than real gross output while skyrocketing capital and
operational expenses have led to a serious decline in net returns on
investment.

Further, the industry's economic condition has been

worsened by a significant increase in the amount of low-priced imported
fishery products reaching domestic markets.
Competition in the fishery, where resources are limited, and in
the market, where demand is limited, represent the most significant
obstacles for the industry.

To stabilize the industry and increase the

opportunity for development will require that the conditions of this
competition be altered.

However, how these conditions are altered will

have a dramatic impact upon the character of the industry in the years
ahead.

If we continue to rely upon the status quo, development opportunities

may be lost forever, but an interventionist approach which restricts access
to the fishery and erects trade barriers to foreign product carries inherent
costs which outweigh potential benefits.
This paper has proposed an elimination of those federal financial
assistance programs which facilitate

entry and perpetuate

as a way of altering competitive conditions in the fishery.

overcapitalization
It has also

suggested that foreign nations be encouraged to voluntarily reduce the
volume of fishery exports to the New England region as a way of altering
the conditions of competition in the market.

This is a more acceptable

approach to the conservation/promotion dilemma because it preserves the

7S

independent character of the fishing enterprise in such a way that
pressure on traditional fish stocks is relieved and development
opportunities are increased.
While the fishing industry on a national scale is relatively minot,
at the same time, it represents a primary source of income for many,
it supports a variety of ancillary businesses and it is important to
local economies in discrete regions of the country.

Therefore, the

fishing industry remains an important consideration of the federal
government.

Yet, the best interest of society is not well served if

federal expenditures are continued for programs which do not address the
industry's fundamental difficulties.

A satisfactory resolution of

chronic problems will require a renewed commitment to the industry from
both the private and public sector.

To this end, the federal government

must reevaluate the effectiveness of its intervention and take steps
to encourage a more competitive trade climate.

For its part, the fishing

industry must begin to make a greater investment in its own future.
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